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Equity implications of transport policies, in particular congestion pricing, have been the focus 
of many recent studies. Some studies address the distributions of economic gains and losses 
among different groups of users, generally by income or by location, and propose how to 
calculate  these.  Others  have  focused  on  alternative  schemes  for  recycling  of  transport 
revenues,  commonly  toll  revenues,  in  order  to  address  equity  concerns.  And  some  have 
concentrated  on  different  stakeholders  such  as  consumers,  producers  and  operators,  and 
subgroups among stakeholders that are affected differently by a transport policy. Eliasson and 
Lundberg (2002) provide a survey of these studies. There are not many studies that take up 
the quantification of inequality. Among these the EU funded research projects AFFORD, 
MC-ICAM and PROSPECTS (see Fridstrøm, et al 2000; Minken et al, 2002; MC-ICAM, 
2003). 
 
Equity considerations can be addressed by two alternative approaches. One approach is to 
respond directly to the distributional concerns by assuming an explicit form of social welfare 
function and the choice of a desired inequality aversion parameter. This approach requires a 
general  equilibrium  modelling  approach.  The  second  approach  is  to  apply  an  inequality 
measure to a given pair of distributions of a variable that changes as the result of a policy, 
such as income, accessibility, etc. In this paper equity is addressed by the latter approach 
using a partial equilibrium model of transport for the calculation of the changes in income, 
accessibility and net benefit for different social groups.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the challenges that arise in addressing equity with 
a partial equilibrium model of transport model. An overview of some equity measures and 
their properties is provided first. The performances of these equity measures are evaluated for 
alternative road-pricing schemes for Oslo.   
 
This paper shows the sizes of the equity measures are quite sensitive to the level of spatial 
disaggregation and to the scale and translation in the measure of welfare. While it should in 
many cases be possible to pass judgment on which one of a set of alternative policies is the 
most equitable, relating the equity objective to a predefined value of any of these measures is 
not a desirable approach. Furthermore it is difficult to make a judgement about the equity 
implication of a policy on the basis of a single measure and without a thorough examination 
of several measures.     
 
1. Introduction 
 Partial equilibrium models of transport or integrated transport and land use are most often 
used for the evaluation of the impacts of a toll scheme and the incidence of benefits and costs. 
These models do not capture the interactions between the transport sector and the rest of the 
economy. It is common  to implicitly address  these interactions by the use of  a so-called 
“marginal cost of public funds” (MCF). Roughly speaking, the marginal cost of public fund is 
the cost to society of raising a EURO’s worth of public revenue by distortionary taxation. It is 
assumed that the distortionary tax that will have to be used is the income tax. However, 
different tax instruments, including the pricing instruments of transport, will have different 
MCFs. From an efficiency point of view, the instrument with the least MCF should be used. 
But efficiency  is not the only concern. As Sandmo (2000) points out, a main reason  for 
distortionary  taxes  is  to  address  redistribution,  otherwise  uniform  or  arbitrary  lumps-sum 
taxes  could  have  been  levied.  The  redistribution  impacts  depend  not  only  on  which  tax 
instrument is used but also on how revenue is recycled, e.g., used in the public sector or 
recycled to the households. The distortions in the rest of the economy make the secondary 
effects of transport policies on the rest of the economy relevant.  
 
A general equilibrium framework addresses the interactions of the transport sector with the 
rest  of the economy  explicitly.  An  example  of  this  type  of models  is  TRENEN  (see  for 
example Proost and Van Dender, 2002). It however lacks important details in the transport 
and land use markets. The level of detail among partial equilibrium transport models varies 
with respect to geographical detail, presentation of the transport networks, alternative modes 
of travel, time periods (usually peak and off peak) as well as the segmentation of the market 
by  travel  purposes.  Behavioural  responses  with  different  time  dimensions  such  as  route 
choice, mode and destination choices and trip frequency are usually captured in transport 
models. The architecture of these models can be exploited to apply the models for different 
time  horizons  from  the  very  short  to  medium  run.  The  use  of  disaggregate  data  in  the 
estimation allows individual and household socio-economic characteristics to enter the model 
formulation as explanatory variables. Consequently it is possible to apply this class of models 
to evaluate the differences in responses of different segments of a population to a transport 
policy. While partial equilibrium models must inevitably represent economy-wide distortions 
and distributional impacts in a coarse way, this level of detail in the representation of the 
transport market is a strong point with respect to equity analysis of policies. An example of 
this type of models is RETRO (see for example Fridstrøm, et al, 2000). 
  
This paper demonstrates some of the challenges that arise in analysing equity implications of 
a transport policy with a more traditional transport model system. The next section focuses on 
a review of some equity measures and their properties. In section three the performances of 
equity measures are examined in two case studies for Oslo. The first case study is taken from 
the AFFORD project (see Fridstrøm, et al, 2000). The second case study for Oslo is from a 
more  recent  study  (see  Ramjerdi  et  al,  2005).    Section  four  present  some  results  and 
conclusions.  
 
2. Equity and accessibility measures   
 
The most central issue in the assessment of equity is related to how equity is defined.  Equity 
can be defined along many dimensions such as justice, rights, treatment of equals, capability, 
opportunities, resources, wealth, primary goods, income, welfare, utility and so on (see Sen, 
1982, 1992). Sen (1992) states that every normative social theory that has stood the test of 
time demand equality of something that is regarded as particularly important in that theory. 
Sen continues by suggesting that demanding equality in one space implies inequality in some other  space.  An  important  ethical  issue  is  related  to  the  equality  of  consideration.  Sen  
suggests that “the need to defend one’s theories, judgements, and claims to others who may 
be directly or indirectly involved, makes the equality of consideration at some level a hard 
requirement  to  avoid”  (Sen,  1992,  p18).  Furthermore  the  relative  advantages  and 
disadvantages  of  people  can  be  judged  in  terms  of  many  different  variables,  e.g.  their 
respective incomes, wealth, utilities, resources, liberties, rights, quality of life, and so on. 
“The plurality of variables on which we can possibly focus (the focal variables) to evaluate 
interpersonal inequality makes it necessary to face, at a very elementary level, a hard decision 
regarding the perspective to be adopted. This problem of choice of the `evaluative space` (that 
is, the selection of the relevant focal variables) is crucial to analysing inequality” (Sen, 1992, 
p20).  It  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  paper  to  provide  an  overview  how  different  social 
philosophies have defined equity and to compare these. It is however important to emphasis 
that the different aspects  of equity are important for different groups in society and it  is 
important to provide measures for the evaluation of their concerns and to reflect their views. 
 
In order to address equity a unit of analysis and the variable along which equity is to be 
analysed have to be defined. In a social context the unit of analysis can be an individual or a 
collective unit such as a nuclear family, women, elderly, disabled, a region, etc. The choice of 
the unit depends on the interpretation of the inequality measurement. In some context it is 
natural to adopt an individual as the unit, for example when we are looking at exposure to 
pollutants. In other contexts, e.g. when we are examining the distribution of wealth or income, 
it might be more useful to adopt a collective unit such as a household. Furthermore it is 
possible to address inequalities along a certain dimension in terms of between- and within 
groups such as between genders, regions, etc. Coherence and homogeneity are the important 
criteria in the selection of collective unit.  
 
2.1 Properties of equity measures 
 
Different measures of inequality reflect different perception of inequality. The sets of weights 
that different views attach to transfers at various points in a distribution are different. That can 
result in contradictory ranking of a given pair of distributions (see Kolm, 1969; Atkinson, 
1970;  Sen,  1973).  In  this  sense  inequality  measures  have  both  normative  and  descriptive 
content. These measures can be used to describe the differences in a population with respect 
to a given variable such as income, but they can also represent the manner in which these 
differences should be measured.  There are numerous axioms that put specific requirements 
on the properties of a measure of inequality. In the following we summarize a number of these 
axioms  (see  Harrison  and  Seidl  1994;  Myles,  2000).  These  axioms  are  used  for  the 
construction of the axiomatic measures of inequality.   
The  symmetry  or  anonymity  axiom  requires  the  inequality  measure  for  a  given  income 
distribution in a given population not to be affected by the order in which the individuals are 
labelled. In other words it is not important who is rich and who is poor. This axiom seems 
very obvious. All the measures that are described in the followings sections satisfy this axiom.  
The axiom of transfer or Pigou-Dalton principle says that a transfer of income from a rich 
person to a poor person should reduce the measured inequality as long as the income of the 
rich person stays higher than the poor person after the transfer. This view was originally 
expressed by Pigou in 1912 (Pigou, 1954) and shared by Dalton in 1920 (Dalton, 1920). The 
Pigou-Dalton principle is an important property that any acceptable measure of inequality 
should satisfy.   The principle of population requires the inequality measure to be independent of the size of 
the population.  
The scale invariance axiom or relative inequality aversion axiom demands that the measured 
inequality  should  not  change  if  all  members  of  a  population  get  the  same  proportional 
increase in incomes. Kolm (1976a, 1976b) regards this as a (politically) rightist view.  
The  translation  invariance  axiom  or  absolute  inequality  aversion  axiom  requires  that  the 
measured inequality does not change by changing all incomes by the same amount as long as 
the changes do not lead to a negative income. This is regarded as a (politically) leftist view.  
The  decomposability  axiom  requires  that  there  should  be  a coherent  relationship  between 
inequality in the whole population and its constituent parts. The basic idea is that one should 
be able to define the inequality measure of the total population as a function of inequality 
within its constituent parts and inequality between the subgroups. 
 
2.2 Some inequality measures 
 
Inequality measures are often classified as statistical, welfare or axiomatic (see for example 
Myles, 2000 and Cowell, 1977). Statistical measures examine the distribution of any variable 
in a given population such as income. Examples of these are; range, variance, measure of 
variation, log variance, Gini measure and Theil’s entropy measure. Welfare measures rely on 
welfare  economics  and  incorporate  equity  concerns  into  a  welfare  function.  Axiomatic 
measures are derived by addressing the properties that a satisfactory measure ought to have. 
These measures can be applied to the evaluation of inequality of any vector or distribution of 
observations, even to  non-economic data  such as the distribution of the ambient level  of 
pollutants or accessibility over an area. The following measures are examined in this study.  
1. Range, R, defined as 
 
    R=Ymax –Ymin         (1) 
2. Variance, V, defined as 
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3. Coefficient of variation, c, defined as 
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4. Relative mean deviation, M, defined as 
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5. Logarithmic variance, v, defined as 
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6. Variance of logarithms, vl, defined as 
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7. The Gini measure, G, defined as 
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8. The Theil’s entropy measure, T, defined as 
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9. The Atkinson index, Ae, defined as 
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10. Kolm’s measure of inequality, Ka, defined as  
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In the above measures  
Y   is a measure of welfare 
n  is the number of observations on welfare 
Y  is the mean level of welfare  
log Y   is the mean level of log of welfare 
e and a in Atkinson and Kolm measures are parameters that address inequality aversion and 
e and  0 a > .  
The first 8 measures are classified as statistical measures, while the last 2 measures (Atkinson 
and Kolm) are welfare measures. The following table summarises some of the properties of 
these measures. 
Table 1 A summary of the properties of inequality measures 
Some important properties   
Measure 
 
Definition  Transfer  Scale invariance  Translation 
invariance 
Variance  Eq. (2)  Yes  No  Yes 
Coeff. Of variation  Eq. (3)  Yes (weak)  Yes  No 
Relative mean deviation  Eq. (4)  Yes  Yes  No 
Logarithmic variance  Eq. (5)  No  Yes  No 
Variance of logarithms  Eq. (6)  No  Yes  No 
Gini   Eq. (7)  Yes (weak)  Yes  No 
Theil’s entropy  Eq. (8)  Yes  Yes  No 
Atkinson-Kolm  Eq. (9)  Yes  Yes  No 
Kolm  Eq. (10)  Yes  No  Yes 
 
The  impacts  of  a  package  of  instruments  can  be  measured  using  non-economic  data.  An 
example of the application of the equity measures to non-economic data is related to the 
changes in the distribution of emission of pollutants over the area of study. It might even be feasible to evaluate the changes in terms of within and between segments of the population. 
The segments can be defined in terms of the socio-economic characteristics of the population 
or by locations in the study area. A decomposable measure is necessary for this purpose (see 
for example Myles, 2000 and Cowell, 1977).  
 
The incidence of net efficiency gains of a transport policy might be different for different 
segments  of a  population or  over a geographical area. It was suggested  earlier  that for a 
correct calculation of the net efficiency gains a spatial general equilibrium model is necessary. 
Addressing the interactions of the transport market with the rest of the economy, especially 
with  the  labour  market,  is  crucial  for  a  correct  calculation  of  the  distribution  of  the  net 
efficiency gains among a population or over a region. It is, however, possible to use different 
measures of inequality or accessibility measures in order to obtain some indication of the 
distribution  of  the  incidence  of  the  net  benefits.  Equity  and  accessibility  measures  only 
suggest the likely direction of impacts and should be treated as such. The ex-post equity 
analysis  provides  some  information  on  how  to  recycle  revenues  to  address  equity 
considerations.  
 
2.3 Some accessibility measures 
 
Two alternative approaches will be used for measuring accessibility (see Geurs and Ritsema 
van Eck, 2001; Baradaran and Ramjerdi, 2002, for a review of accessibility measures). 
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where  
Wj       stands for the mass of opportunities available to i at location j  
f(cij,b) is the deterrence function = 
ij c
ij f(c , ) e
b b =  
b   is assumed to  equal to 0.35 
cij   is the generalised cost of travel by car between i and j.  
 
Three alternative accessibility measures are constructed using this approach as follows  
 
G_Emp   in which Wj is equal to the total employment at j 
G_65+   in which Wj is equal to the total population over 65 years of age at j 
G_20-65   in which Wj is equal to the total population 20-64 years of age at j 
G_W     is which Wj is equal to the female population at j 
 
“Logsum” measure is used defined as:   
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where 
n
i logsum  is the measure of accessibility at location i for individual n 
n
j|i U is the utility of travel to location j given the individual n is located at i 
n
j v reflects attraction at j  n
ij c is the travel cost between i and j 
mis a positive scale parameter that is estimated 
 
3. The performance of the equity measures 
 
The greater Oslo area has a population of about one million with an area of 5,305 km
2. The 
population  density  is  about  140  inhabitants/km
2.  Oslo  city  has  a  population  of  about 
512,0000.  The Oslo toll ring was established in 1990 as a financing scheme. Originally, the 
toll revenue, supplemented by about equal funds from the central government, was to finance 
the “Oslo Package” (now referred to as “Oslo Package 1”), comprising some 50 new road 
projects. It is estimated that by 2007 the total contribution of the scheme to Oslo Package 1 
will amount to NOK 9.1 billion (2002 NOK), approximately 15-20 per cent above the initial 
estimate.  In  2000  the  Parliament  approved  an  increase  in  the  toll  fee  for  financing  an 
investment package on public transport projects, referred to as “Oslo Package 2”.  
 
There  is  much  debate  and  some  interest  in  changing  the  direction  of  the  scheme  to  a 
congestion  pricing  scheme  from  2008.  Amongst  the  different  alternatives  that  have  been 
evaluated for Oslo, there is a time differentiated toll scheme with the purpose of reducing car 
traffic  during  peak  periods.  Revenues  would  be  allocated  to  public  transport  and  to  the 
extension and improvement of roads in the region. The Oslo scheme is most likely to continue 
in some form or other after 2007. The new scheme is often referred to as “Oslo package 3”. 
Equity has been an important concern in the debate on the new package.   
 
In the following sections the performances of the equity measures will be evaluated in two 
case studies for Oslo. The instruments and their levels and the packages used in these case 
studies do not reflect precisely any of the current proposals for the future of the Oslo scheme. 
The lessons are however valid for the evaluation of equity implications of any package of 
instruments. 
 
3.1 Framework for evaluation 
A multi-modal transport model RETRO is used in this study (Ramjerdi and Rand, 1992; Vold, 
2003). RETRO has the following sub-models:  
 
i)  Disaggregate and aggregate license holding models 
ii)  Disaggregate car ownership models 
iii)  Disaggregate models for travel frequency and models for mode and destination 
choices 
iv)  Segmentation model 
v)  Network model 
 
EMME/2, a software package is used for the network model. The number of zones is 438. In 
this case study it is assumed that the land use changes are exogenously defined.  
 
The alternative scenarios are evaluated according to an objective function that accounts for 
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OF  is the net benefit 
t
*  is the horizon year 
r  is a discount rate 
CSt  is the change in the consumer surplus in year t 
PSt  is the change in the producer surplus in year t  
GSt  is the change in the government surplus in year t 
MCFt  is the marginal cost of public funds in year t  
Envt  is the external costs defined as accident, noise and pollution costs and other external 
effects 
gt  is the shadow cost of CO2 emission, reflecting national CO2 target for year t, 
gt  is the amount of CO2 emissions in year t, 
 
The rule-of-half is used for the calculation of the consumer surplus. The changes in the 
producer surplus (revenues net of costs) should be calculated for all the transport operators. 
Since toll and parking operators in this study are government agencies, these will be 
addressed under the government surplus. The public transport operators must earn a surplus 
after subsidy. Hence their surplus is also accounted for under the government surplus. The tax 
revenue associated with car use and car ownership will be included in the government surplus.  
 
Tables 2 and 3 show the unit values that have been adopted in this case study. These are based 
on recommended Norwegian values in urban areas (Eriksen et al, 1999)   
 
Table 2 Values of externalities  (in Euro/vehicle kilometre) 
Mode 
Emissions  
(other than CO2)  Noise  Accidents  CO2 
Car (average)  0.025  0.017  0.027  0.011 
Public Transport (average for bus, and light rail)  0.304  0.170  0.061  0.066 
 
Table 3 Value of travel time (in Euro/hour) 
Mode of travel   Car  Public transport 
In vehicle time  5.64  4.70 
Wait and transfer time  -  5.64 
Auxiliary time  -  5.64 
 
 
3.2   The first case study for Oslo 
 
The first case study is taken from the AFFORD project (see Fridstrøm, et al, 2000). In the 
AFFORD project a number of packages of instruments are calculated in order to maximise the 
objective function described by Equation 13. The optimizations are carried out under two 
alternative assumptions; MCF=1.0 and MCF=1.25. The Gini coefficient and the Lorenz curve 
are used for the evaluations of the equity implications of these packages. For the purpose of 
this  study,  i.e.,  an  evaluation  of  the  performances  of  equity  measures,  only  one  of  these 
packages is selected. This package comprises of a time differentiated (peak and off-peak) toll 
ring scheme (the present location) and time differentiated (peak and off-peak) parking fees 
and for MCF=1.0 (scenario P21). We call this the policy scenario. The toll fee in this scenario 
is about 21.5 NOK during peak periods and no charge during the off-peak. The parking fee is 
slight higher during peak periods (1.025 time the present levels) and slightly lower during the off-peak (0.996 times the present levels). The policy scenario is calculated under alternative 
assumptions about the recycling scheme: no recycling of the revenue, a flat recycling and a 
proportional recycling of the revenue among households. The revenue generated is kept by 
the public treasury in the no recycling scheme. In the flat recycling scheme, the revenue is 
distributed among the households by the same nominal amount of money. In a proportional 
recycling scheme, the revenue is distributed among the households in amounts proportional to 
each household’s initial income, i.e. as a given percentage point income tax relief. Table 4 
shows the income distributions in the reference scenario and in the policy scenario under 
alternative assumptions about the recycling of the revenue.  For more information about the 
performances of these scenarios see Fridstøm, et al (2000). 
 
Table  4.  Income  distribution  in  the  reference  scenario  and  the  policy  scenario  under 
alternative assumptions about recycling   
  Income/consumption unit. Euros/year in scenario 
Income group  Reference  No recycling  Flat recycling 
Proportional 
recycling 
1  1735.75  1719.04  1800.62  1726.42 
2  7616.81  7592.89  7652.53  7625.25 
3  11368.78  11328.95  11397.92  11377.25 
4  14830.40  14777.62  14846.38  14840.63 
5  18023.72  17965.65  18035.04  18042.22 
6  21163.99  21096.63  21166.25  21186.54 
7  25347.27  25274.57  25339.42  25382.25 
8  41805.57  41723.34  41787.44  41900.94 
 
 
Table 5 shows the performances of the equity measures described in Section 2.2 when applied 
to income distributions presented in Table 4. It is important to point out that the scale of 
income is quite important in a number of these measures. The scale of income used for the 
calculation of these measures is in Euros/year, except in the calculation of the Kolm measure, 
where the scale is in 10,000 Euros/year. This scale of income makes the Kolm measures 
comparable  to  the  Atkinson  measures  in  size.  Note  that  the  Atkinson  measure  does  not 
depend on the scale while the Kolm measure does.     
 
A first task is to compare the performances of these measures when comparing the reference 
scenario and the policy scenario with no recycling. The average income of all income groups 
decreases in the policy scenario with no recycling. However the low income groups loose less 
proportional  to  their  incomes  than  the  high  income  groups.  These  shifts  in  income 
distributions  are  reflected  in  all  measures.  Mean,  coefficient  of  variation,  relative  mean 
deviation, logarithmic variance, Atkinson measures and the Gini coefficient suggest that the 
policy  scenario  with  no  recycling  has  worsens  the  income  distribution.  Range,  variance, 
variance of logarithms, the Theil measure and Kolm measures suggest that the policy scenario 
with no distribution improves the income distribution.   
  
The  comparison of measures of  equity for the reference scenario  and the policy  scenario 
under  alternative  recycling  suggests  that  the  policy  scenario  with  a  flat  recycling  scheme 
produces the most desired income distribution. The exceptions are the mean and the variance 
of  logarithms.  Coefficient  of  variation,  relative  mean  deviation,  logarithmic  variance,  the 
Theil measure, Atkinson measures, and the Gini coefficient suggest that the policy scenario 
with no recycling produces the most undesirable income distribution. Note that the Atkinson 
measures and the Gini coefficients are almost similar for the no recycling and the proportional recycling schemes. Range, variance and Kolms measures suggest that the policy scenario with 
proportional recycling result in the worst income distribution. 
 
These results suggest that for the evaluation of the equity implications of a transport policy, it 
is desirable to look at a number of equity measures rather than using a single measure.    
 
Table 5.  Performances of some equity measures  
  Scenario 
Equity measure  Reference  No recycling  Flat recycling 
Proportional 
recycling 
Mean  17737   17685  17753  17760 
Range Ymax –Ymin  40070   40004  39987  40175 
Variance  132062507  131596975  131533921  132719502 
Coefficient of 
variation    0.647919  0.648667  0.646014  0.648664 
Relative mean 
deviation   0.498891  0.499310  0.497310  0.499308 
Logarithmic variance    0.170700  0.171504  0.166544  0.171501 
Variance of 
logarithms  12.435540  12.425635  12.447230  12.437219 
Theil   0.094088  0.094292  0.093347  0.094291 
Atkinson         
  e=0.0001  0.000021665  0.000021712  0.000021494  0.000021712 
  e=0.001  0.000216678  0.000217149  0.000214972  0.000217147 
  e=0.005  0.001084048  0.001086404  0.001075495  0.001086394 
  e=0.01  0.002169744  0.002174462  0.002152581  0.002174442 
  e=0.05  0.010476763  0.010499671  0.01039219  0.010499573 
  e=0.1  0.020022158  0.020066296  0.019856201  0.020066109 
Kolm         
  a =0.0001  0.000028676  0.000028575  0.000028561  0.000028819 
  a =.001  0.000286689  0.000285678  0.000285541  0.000288114 
  a =0.005  0.001431813  0.001426763  0.001426078  0.001438924 
  a =0.01  0.002859550  0.002849459  0.002848090  0.002873730 
  a =0.05  0.070674059  0.070423717  0.070389532  0.07102009 
  a =0.1  0.278636185  0.277644814  0.277508219  0.279978572 
Gini  0.353895  0.354231  0.352785  0.354230 
 
 
3.3  A second case study for Oslo 
 
The second case study is taken from the SPECTRUM project (see Timms et al, 2005). The 
objective function described by Equation 13 is used to evaluate a reference scenario and a 
number of packages of instruments for Oslo. These packages are calculated with different 
assumptions about the value of MCF. Among these, a package of instruments comprising a 
time differentiated toll ring scheme (about 35 NOK during the peak periods about 14 NOK 
during the off-peak), an increase in fuel taxes by 50% and an increase in public transport 
frequency  of  services  by  5.8  percent  performs  best.  Table  6  shows  a  summary  of  the 
performance of the policy scenario compared with the reference scenario. It is assumed that 
MCF=1.0. For more information see Ramjerdi et al (2005). 
 
Table 6. The performance of the policy scenario compared with the reference scenario 
(million Euro/year) Consumer surplus  -464.5 
Government surplus   
   Fuel tax   343.0 
   Annual car taxes  -30.6 
   Toll revenue (net)  158.7 
   Parking revenue  -4.1 
   Public transport revenue  23.0 
   PT investment  -19.4 
  Total   470.6 
Externalities (emission of pollutions, noise 
and accident)  38.0 
CO2  6.0 
   
Total   50.1 
 
 
Table  7  shows  the  differences  between  the  accessibility  measures  in  the  policy  and  the 
reference scenarios. Figure 1 shows the different areas in the Oslo region. As can be expected, 
all the differences are negative in all areas in the Oslo region. An increase in fuel tax and a 
toll will drastically decrease accessibility by car (G_Emp, G_W, G_65+ and G_20-65). Note 
that G_W, G_65+ and G_20-65 measures indicate the accessibility of a particular segment of 
the population to the different areas in the Oslo region while G_Emp indicates accessibility to 
the  employment in  different locations. All these measures have similar patterns.  They  all 
indicate that the accessibility by car to Upper  Groruddalen will decrease most for all the 
segments of the population. Accessibility for employment (G_Emp) and accessibility for the 
population of age 20-65 (G_20-65) have similar patterns.  
 







Age over 65 
G_65+ 
Age 20-65 
G_20-65  Logsum 
1. Oslo West  -1.11  -0.82  -0.29  -1.31  -5.10 
2. Oslo, East  -2.19  -1.30  -0.50  -2.01  -5.68 
3. Oslo, outer West   -7.15  -5.96  -2.06  -9.57  -5.74 
4. Lower Grorurddalen  -4.79  -3.00  -1.15  -4.66  -5.49 
5. Upper Groruddalen  -16.09  -18.85  -6.24  -29.98  -8.72 
6. Østensjøbyen  -7.86  -12.37  -6.22  -18.06  -4.81 
7. Oslo South  -1.16  -3.65  -1.54  -5.53  -9.13 
8. West region  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -3.67 
9. Romerike  -0.24  -0.42  -0.14  -0.64  -7.92 
10. Follo  -5.03  -8.89  -2.75  -14.05  -4.89 
 
Figure 1. The greater Oslo area 
  
 
A main problem with the gravity approach is that the scale of the accessibility measures is 
ordinal. The “logsum measure” closely compares with the changes in the consumer surplus. It 
also captures the effects of provision of the public transport services. This measure suggests 
that the benefits in the policy scenario are not evenly distributed and hence have potential 
adverse distributional effect.  
 
To evaluate the significance of the observed variations in the geographical distributions of 
welfare (captured by the logsum measure) the equity measures described in section 2.2 are 
used.  Table  8  shows  a  summary  of  some  of  these  inequality  measures  applied  to  the 
geographical distributions of  welfare over  49 zones  that make up  the  Oslo region. While 
almost all measures are quite similar in both scenarios, they suggest that the geographical 
distribution of welfare is more even in reference scenario than in the policy scenario.   
 
Table 8. Summary of some inequality measures in the policy and the reference scenarios for 
the Oslo region (49 zones) 
49 zones  Policy scenario  Reference scenario 
Mean  498.35  504.89 
Range Ymax –Ymin  360.67  361.56 
Variance  5175.71  5072.69 
Coefficient of variation   0.144  0.141 
Relative mean deviation   0.1070  0.1118 
Logarithmic variance  0.0059  0.0056 
Variance of logarithms  5.1210  4.5333 
Theil  0.2480  0.2366 
 
Table  9  shows  the  summary  of  all  the  described  inequality  measures  applied  to  the 
geographical  distributions  of  welfare  over  10  zones  that  represent  the  Oslo  region.  A comparison of the measures in this table with the corresponding measures in Table 8 shows 
that the level of zonal aggregation affects the size of most measures. This is partly due to the 
approximations  in  aggregation  (not  properly  weighted)  as  well  as  the  properties  of  the 
measures. This table also suggests most measures are quite similar in both scenarios and that 
the geographical distribution of welfare is more even in reference scenario than in the policy 
scenario.  Table  9  also  shows  the  sensitivity  of  the  Atkinson  and  Kolm  measures  to  the 
inequality aversion parameter. The Atkinson measure is more sensitive to the value of the 
inequality aversion parameter than the Kolm measure.  
 
While the property of a measure provides information about its change with a translation, it is 
relevant to get some sense of the level of change, if any. To get an understanding of the size 
of  the  change,  the  measures  were  calculated  for  both  scenarios  (reference  and  policy 
scenarios)  after  a  translation.  The  translation  was  performed  by  subtracting  from  welfare 
(logsums) 443 units. The aim was to avoid negative values for the welfare measure as the 
result of the translation and to obtain small values for the level of welfares. Table 10 shows 
the summary of the results. 
 
Table 9 Summary of inequality measures in the policy and the reference scenario for the Oslo 
region (10 zones) 
10 zones  Policy scenario  Reference scenario 
Mean  519.09  525.29 
Range. Ymax –Ymin  115.20  113.01 
Variance  1714.08  1710.49 
Coefficient of variation  0.0798  0.0787 
Relative Mean 
Deviation  0.0703  0.0697 
Logarithmic variance  0.0013  0.0013 
Variance of logarithms  5.2007  5.2205 
Theil  0.0014  0.0013 
Atkinson      
    e = 0.0001  0.0000003  0.0000003 
    e = 0.001  0.0000033  0.0000032 
    e = 0.005  0.0000163  0.0000616 
    e = 0.01  0.0000326  0.0001260 
Kolm     
    a = 0.0001  0.0373  0.0372 
    a = 0.001  0.3765  0.3757 
    a = 0.005  1.9607  1.9563 
    a = 0.01  4.0774  4.0663 
Gini  0.04199  0.04118 
 
Table 10 Summary of inequality measures in the policy and the reference scenario for the 
Oslo region (10 zones) after a translation in welfares by 443 units. 
10 zones & Trans 443  Policy scenario  Reference scenario 
Mean  76.09  82.29 
Range, Ymax –Ymin  115.20  113.01 
Variance  1714.08  1710.49 
Coefficient of variation  0.5441  0.5026 
Relative Mean 
Deviation  0.4796  0.4451 
Logarithmic variance  0.6310  0.1687 Variance of logarithms  2.5538  2.5326 
Theil  0.9287  0.7264 
Atkinson      
   e = 0.0001  0.000021  0.000017 
   e = 0.001  0.000214  0.000167 
   e = 0.005  0.001072  0.000838 
   e = 0.01  0.002150  0.001679 
Kolm     
   a= 0.0001  0.0373  0.0372 
   a=0.001  0.3765  0.3757 
   a= 0.005  1.9607  1.9563 
   a= 0.01  4.0774  4.0663 
Gini  0.2860  0.2626 
 
A comparison of Tables 9 and 10 suggests that the size of the measures that are not translation 
invariant change significantly. These measures suggest that the geographical distribution of 
welfare  is  more  inequitable  in  the  policy  scenario  than  in  reference  scenario  once  the 
translation is performed. 
 
While  this  exercise  suggests  that  accessibility  and  equity  measures can  be  applied  to  the 
evaluation  of  potential  changes  in  the  distribution  of  welfare  caused  by  a  package  of 
instruments, one needs to apply them cautiously. Accessibility measures, other than a logsum 
measure, are ordinal and hence it is problematic to apply equity measures to examine changes 
in their distributions. 
 
The logsum measures in Table 7 suggest that the distribution of benefits of the package in the 
policy scenario is potentially uneven over the Oslo area. The difference between the different 
areas is as high as 210 Euro/year for an average traveller. Yet, the sizes of the different equity 
measures  (see Tables  8,  9, and 10) vary significantly  as the result of the level of spatial 
disaggregation and a translation in the measure of welfare. Similarly some of the measures are 
quite sensitive to the scale of the welfare measure. This illustrates that relating the equity 
objective to a predefined value on any of these measures is not desirable approach. Once we 
have defined the units to be compared and the distributional concern to be addressed, it will, 
however,  often  be  possible  to  rank  alternatives  with  respect  to  equity.  Furthermore,  it  is 
difficult to make a judgement about the equity implication of a policy on the basis of a single 
measure and without a thorough examination of several measures and their implications.  
 
This exercise relies on a partial equilibrium transport model and ex-post evaluation of the 
equity implication of a package of instruments. Nonetheless, the lessons can be extended to a 
general  equilibrium  approach  where  an  explicit  form  of  social  welfare  function  and  an 
inequality aversion parameter is used to address equity concerns. Table 8 shows that Atkinson 
measures with aversion parameters of up to 0.001 favour the reference scenario for equity. 
With  aversion  parameters  of  larger  than  0.001  the  policy  scenario  becomes  the  favoured 
scenario. Hence it is important to explore the implications of the aversion parameter, possibly, 
in the form of a sensitivity analysis.      
 
 
6.  Some conclusions 
 
Partial equilibrium models of transport or integrated transport and land use models are the 
most commonly used planning tools for the evaluation of the impacts of transport policies with  respect  to  efficiency  and  equity.    The  lack  of  spatial  details  in  general  equilibrium 
models limits their applications. The main aim of this paper is to illustrate some important 
issues related to the evaluation of equity using a partial equilibrium model of transport with 
examples from Oslo. 
 
Equity  and  accessibility  measures  can  only  provide  information  about  the  potential 
distribution of welfare among a population or over a geographical area. The size of the equity 
measures  is  quite  sensitive  to  the  level  of  spatial  disaggregation  and  to  the  scale  and 
translation  in the measure  of welfare.  While it should  in many  cases be  possible to pass 
judgment  on  which  one  of  a  set  of  alternatives  is  the  most  equitable, relating  the  equity 
objective  to  a  predefined  value  of  any  of  these  measures  is  not  a  desirable  approach. 
Furthermore it is difficult to make a judgement about the equity implication of a policy on the 
basis of a single measure and without a thorough examination of several measures.     
Accessibility measures, other than a logsum measure, are ordinal and hence it is problematic 
to apply equity measures to examine the changes in their distributions.  
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